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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
Viking Construction, Inc., an Idaho 
Corporation, 
Appellant, 
v. 
SUPREME COURT CASE NO.: &+8&%- 
3w3/ 
KOOTENAI COUNTY, STATE OF IDAHO 
. ' Hayden Lake Irrigation District, an Idaho 
quasi-municipal corporation, 
Respondent. 
KOOTENAI DISTRICT COURT CASE NO.: CV 04-8889 
APPELLANT'S OPENING BRIEF 
1 ... ., 
HONORABLE JOHN PATRICK LUSTER, DISTRICT COURT JUDGE PRESIDING 
APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT FOR 
Susan P. Weeks 
Attorney for Respandents 
Residing in Coeur d'Alene, Idaho 
Scott Rose 
Attorney for Appellants 
Residing in Boise, Idaho 
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viii 
ARGUMENT 
1. 
The District Court Misconstrued The Irrigation District 
Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act. 
The Irrigation District Domestic Water System Revenue Bond Act (hereinafter, the 
"Act") consists of fifteen-interrelated statutes. (I.C. $543-1906 to -1920). 1988 Idaho Session 
Laws, Ch. 299. The express purpose of the Act is to enable "irrigation districts to issue revenue 
bonds for domestic water systems following an election." Statement of Purpose, RS 21485, Bill 
H 676. The Act sets out a statutory scheme to finance residential water works through the 
issuance of revenue bonds after electoral approval. 
The district court found the Hayden Lake Irrigation District (hereinafter "HLID") board of 
directors (hereinafter "board") collected hook-on fees from new users pursuant to I.C. $43- 
1909(e) of the Act. Though the board collected money, it coinplied with no requirements of the 
Act. The board did not seek ratepayer approval for issuance of revenue bonds or issue revenue 
bonds. Its failure to hold an election of the ratepayers for approval to issue revenue bonds and its 
failure to issue revenue bonds defeat the Act's purpose directly. The board never issued revenue 
bonds to finance projects even though the legislature put the Act in place so that specific 
domestic water projects could be financed. The district court's finding was not a correct 
interpretation of the statute in furtherance of the purposes of the Act. 
The district court and the board failed to recognize I.C. $43-1909(e) only authorizes an 
inigation district to collect fees for the services, facilities and commodities furnished by water 
works if the fees collected pursuant to the Act are allocated and budgeted in accordance with the 
statutory scheme legislated in the Act. The district court's interpretation divorces I.C.543- 
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1909(e) from the rest of the Act. 
It is a well-recognized rule of law that a section of the statute in an act should be 
construed in the light of the purpose for which the legislature enacted the particular act. Parts of 
a statute are not to be viewed in isolation, but should be construed as a whole. Bush v. Oliver 86 
Idaho 380,386 P.2d 967 (1963), citilxg Colburn v. Wilson, 24 Idaho 94, 132 P. 579 (1913). 
Statutes must also be construed as a whole without separating one provision from another. 
Sherwood & Roberts, Inc. v. Riplinger, 103 Idaho 535,650 P.2d 677 (1982); Idaho Power Co. v. 
Idaho Pub. Utils. Comm'n, 102 Idaho 744,639 P.2d 442 (1981). It is the duty of courts in 
construing statutes to asceriain the legislative intent and to give effect thereto. Carpenter v. Twin 
Falls County, 107 Idaho 575,691 P.2d 1190 (1984) citing Summers v. Dooley, 94 Idaho 87,481 
P.2d 318 (1971). 
The fiscal impact stated along with the express purpose in Bill H 676, is in part: "It would 
effect to users of the system who through rates, fees, tolls or charges would repay the bonds and 
interest thereon. This financial burden on the system users would be authorized by an election." 
Fiscal Impact, RS 21485, Bill H 676. According to the House Local Government Committee 
Minutes dated, February 24, 1988, "Mr. Hildeman said that this proposal will give irrigation 
districts the ability to issue revenue bonds for domestic water systems following an election. The 
users of the system would repay the bonds not the irrigation district." House Local Government 
Committee Minutes, February 24, 1988, RS 21485, p. 2. 
According to the Minutes of the Resources and Environment Committee, attorney Mike 
Moore "noted the bill was drafted to meet the needs of a few irrigation systems." Resources and 
Environment Committee Minutes, March 21, 1988, p. 2. The legislative history further reveals 
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the Hayden Lake area domestic water problems may have given birth to the Act, as explained 
immediately below! According to the Resources and Conservation Committee Minutes dated 
March 9, 1988, "Representative Giovanelli explained this bill was needed for domestic water 
systems. Currently domestic water systems that are part of an irrigation district cannot set tolls 
and charges to provide for repayment of borrowed funds and interest thereon. This bill would 
grant irrigation districts the power to issue revenue bonds for domestic water systems following 
an election. He stated that cities and water districts presently have that power. He cited the 
specific problems of the Hayden Lake area." (emphasis added). Resources and Conservation 
Committee Minutes, March 9, 1988, H676, p.2. 
The legislative history also further reveals the underlying need for improvements was 
related to environmental quality issues of the whole system. Comments made by Mr. Sherl 
Chapman indicated the need for "borrowing privileges to help the small domestic water 
companies upgrade their systems to meet the forthcoming more stringent government standards." 
Resources and Conservation Committee Minutes, March 9, 1988, H676, p.2. Clearly upgrading 
the system to meet new standards was not intended to effect only new users, but rather to effect 
all users of the system. It certainly makes sense for all the users - not just the recently arriving - 
to share in the expense of upgrading the system to meet more stringent government standards. 
The district court erred as a matter of law finding an irrigation district was empowered under I.C. 
$43-1909(e) to exact money only from new users in the irrigation district. 
Though the Hayden Lake area domestic water problems may have given birth to the Act, 
the board did not seek funding through the Act. In September 2001, the board passed HLID 
Resolution No. 01-014 for the issuance of revenue bond financing of water work improvements 
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pursuant to the Act. Ex. A, pp. 48-56. However, that is as far as the board went. The issue was 
not put before the electorate. Tr. p. 33,ll. 18-23; Rohrbach Depo. Vol. I, p. 9,l. 21-p.10,1.14; 
Rohrbach Depo. Vol. 11, p. 6,ll. 15-17. Instead "the board asked for an advisory committee to 
investigate how they can raise money for future improvements to the District, such as a tower 
without an assessment increase." Ex. A, p.57. The board then decided to borrow money from 
DEQ and/or to seek judicial confirmation for bond financing. Ex. A, pp. 58-62. A judicially 
confirmed bond election was not held. Collection of hook-on fees, however, continued. 
By interpreting I.C. $ 43-1909(e) in a vacuum out of context and apart from the related 
statutes, the district court misconstrued the Act and failed to recognize the power granted in I.C. 
$43-1909(e) was to effect its purpose. To hold HLID could collect fees without the issuance of 
revenue bonds defies logic. It contradicts the purpose and statutory scheme for irrigation district 
domestic water worlcs financing. The power granted in LC. $43-1909(e) is contingent on the 
issuance of revenue bonds, after and only after, approval of the electorate. 
The Act clearly demonstrates the legislature's express intention for a comprehensive plan. 
For instance, the literal language in I.C.543-1909 states the power granted is "under and subject 
to" provisions LC. $43-1909(a) through (g). Paragraph "(d)" provides for revenue bond 
financing. The district court's interpretation renders I.C.$43-1909 internally inconsistent. 
The express language in LC. 543-1914 requires a board to engage an engineer to draw up 
plans and estimate costs of a specific project; to order the construction or acquisition of the 
works; to issue revenue bonds for funding water works only after notice by publication and 
"assent of a majority of the qualified electors voting;" to issue revenue bonds in an amount 
necessary to pay the cost of the works; and to use the revenue derived from rates and charges for 
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the use of, and the service rendered by the works, to retire revenue bonds. It is not consistent 
with the statutory scheme to collect fees pursuant to authority to collect fees to pay back bonds, 
and not seek issuance of bonds. The district court's interpretation renders LC.$43-1909 
inconsistent with 843-1914. 
Construing the statutes in the Act together along with a review of the history of the 
legislative scheme, it is obvious and it must lead to the conclusion I.C. $43-1909(e) can not be 
read in a vacuum. It would be contrary to reason to assume that the legislature could have 
intended for I.C. $43-1909(e) to apply in circumstances where neither the basic purpose of the 
statute, nor, any purpose of the Act could be served. 
Moreover, for I.C. $43-1909(e) to have any meaning and effect can not be construed to 
render the remaining paragraphs and sections of the Act superfluous. Under the district court's 
reasoning, an irrigation district could completely circumvent the statutory scheme. If that was 
the legislative intent, then it simply could have enacted that option. The district court's 
interpretation leads to an absurd result by nullifying the other statutes in the Act. State v. 
Schrnitt, 144 Idaho 768,770, 171 P.3d 259,261 (Ct. App. 2007); State v. Harvey, 142 Idaho 727, 
730,132 P.3d 1255, 1258 (Ct. App. 2006). 
Neither the district court, nor the board responded to ihe mandate of the legislative 
scheme. The district court failed to construe LC. $43-1909(e) in ascertaining legislative intent 
and thereby defeated the purpose for which the legislature enacted the Act. 
The District Court Misconstrued And Incorrectly Applied 
Loomis, Equity Buy-in, And The Idaho Revenue Bonding Act. 
The district court found the board collected hook-on fees in the exercise of a proprietary 
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function relying on Loomis. Loomis v. City ofHailey, 119 Idaho 434, 807 P.2d 1272 (1991), 
The Loomis equity buy-in concept (and the Bonding Revenue Act) applied by the Court in 
Loomis persuaded the district court. The district court did not correctly apply Loomis, the 
Bonding Revenue Act, or the equity buy-in concept. 
The District Court Erred Finding HLID Acted Pursuant To A 
Proprietary Function. 
In Loomis the Court indicated the City of Hailey collected connection fees pursuant to a 
proprietary function and the Idaho Bonding Revenue Act. Loomis, at 438. In Potts Constr. Co. 
v. North Kootenai Water District, 141 Idaho 678,681, 116 P.3d 8, 11 (2005) the Court indicated 
Hailey's connection fee in Loomis, was upheld as a valid exercise of police power authority 
HLID at summary judgment insisted it collected hook-on fees pursuant to a proprietary function 
and not pursuant to a police power governmental function. The board took no action within its 
police powers in Mherance of a govemnental function or regulatory fee. 
While the actual construction and operation of irrigation district water works is pursuant 
to a proprietary function, the raising of revenue to deEray the expense of construction and 
operation, as well as the conduct of the business of the corporation is pursuant to police powers. 
"In Stephenson v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 49 Idaho 189,288 Pac. 421,69 A. L. R. 1225, it was held 
that notwithstanding an irrigation district is a quasi-public corporation and possesses some 
governmental powers and exercises some governmental functions, the construction and operation 
of irrigation canals and ditches are proprietary rather than governmental functions." Lewiston 
Orchards Irrigation Dist. v. Gilmore, 53 Idaho 377,383,23 P.2d 720,722 (1933). However, in 
"raising revenue to defray the expense of constructing and operating irrigation systems and the 
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conduct of the business of the corporation. . . irrigation districts are exercising governmental 
functions." Id., at 380. "Irrigation districts are public corporations, though not strictly municipal 
in the sense of exercising governmental functions other than those connected with raising 
revenue to defray the expense of constructing and operating the irrigation system." Indian Cove 
Irrigation Dist. v. Prideqaux, 25 Idaho 112, 136 P. 618 (1913). 
The board raises hook-on fee revenue to pay the expense of constructing and operating 
the irrigation system. The district court erred as a matter of law determining the board collected 
hook-on fee revenue as a proprietary function. For the purpose of analyzing the district court's 
application of Zoomis, equity buy-in, and the Bonding Revenue Act with the Act, it is assumed, 
but not admitted, the board exercised a proprietaq function, even though it raises revenue 
through hook-on fees to defray the expense of constructing and operating the irrigation system. 
b. 
The District Court Misconstrued Eauity Buv-in. 
An equity buy-in is a formula which allows a new user to buy into a portion of the current 
equity value of the system. Loomis, at p. 436. The Court found the equity buy-in concept was 
legislatively authorized in the Idaho Revenue Bonding Act, Title 50, which in turn was 
authorized by Const., Art. VIII, $3. The district court, however, took Loomis too far and decided 
inconsistently with Loomis. The board's collection of hook-on fees are not in any sense an equity 
buy-in. 
The purpose of Hailey's equity buy-in formula in Zoomis was so that new users paid their 
proportionate purchase price of the depreciated value of the system. An appropriate equity buy- 
in fee formula is rationally related and calculated starting with a determination of the then current 
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depreciated value of the capital assets. 
If the hook-on fee revenue was based on an equity buy-in theory, then a calculation 
according to a formula would exist relating the fee amount to the replacement value of its water 
system. No such evaluation took place or exists. The board neither attempted to determine, nor 
did determine the current depreciated value of the system. The hook-on fee is not related to 
HLID's depreciated assets, replacement value of the system, or any other pertinent fact. The 
board did not create a formula relating the current depreciated value to the fee. Instead, the board 
simply collects hook-on fees as a source of revenue. The district court erred finding hook-on fee 
revenue generated reserves as an equity buy-in. Memo., p. 17. 
The record reflects the primary puspose of hook-on fees was to pay for future capital 
assets and future improvements required due to population growth, and not for a proportionate 
purchase of the system's current value. According to Bert Rohrbach (Chairman of HLID'S board 
of directors) hook-on fees were "primarily designed for plam~ing and financing facilities needed 
to serve new growth and development." Rohrbach Depo., Vol 11, p.12,l. 2 - p. 13,l. 17. 
According to the accountant who audits HLID, "beginning in January, 2002, the Board 
designated that hookup fees (net a charge for meters) be set aside to fund planned future water 
system improvements." Meyer Depo. p. 39,l. 23 - p. 41,l. 17; p. 55,l. 16 - p. 58,l.l; Ex 9, p.10, 
Note 7. According to the board's Minutes, hook-on fee rates were increased by five percent (5%) 
out of concern for future capita1 improvement expenditures. Ex. A, p. 11 1. 
One example in the record of the use of hook-on fee revenue serving new growth and 
development is expressed in HLID Resolution No. 04-09, dated August 3,2004, creating a fund 
from hook-on fees to expend money on expanding the waterline under Highway 95 due to future 
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developed lands. Ex. A, p.128. Another example is the acquisition of the SCADA software 
system, a capital asset for remote monitoring of wells and pumps costing over $200,000. 
SCADA, was paid from "capital improvement money which was hookup fees." Meyer Depo. p. 
41,11.13-17;p.48,1.22-p.50,1.'5;p.52,1.18-p.54,1.22;Ex.9,note7,Ex.11. Thedistrict 
court's conclusion hook-on fees were not the source for any asset acquisition by HLID is clearly 
not supported by the facts in the record. Memo. Op., p.16. Further~nore, the district court's 
conclusion that the hook-on fee revenue is only used to maintain the existing infrastructure is not 
supported by the facts in the record. Memo. Op., p.16. 
There is nothing limiting the use of the revenue from hook-on fees. Meyer Depo. p. 42, 
1.8-p.43,1.13,Ex.12,13,and14;p.61,1.18-p.68,1.8;andp.70,1.20-p.71,1.7. Besides 
banking and spending hook-on fee revenue for new capital assets, the board used the revenue for 
improvements and additions benefitting all the ratepayers' lands. The board found a method to 
pass district-wide costs to new users without increasing bond indebtedness or assessments. 
Hook-on fees are incurred at the disproportionate expense to new ratepayers. Hook-on fees are a 
disguised tax. 
Unlike Hailey's connection fee in Loomis, the purpose of the hook-on fee is not for new 
users to buy into a portion of the current equity value of the system. Rather, hook-on fees are for 
a "buy-in" as in a shake-down, or buying into a poker game, or being able to join the country 
club, and not as a proportionate purchase price of the depreciated value of the system as Loomis 
defines an "equity buy-in." The district court's finding hook-on fee revenue generated reserves 
as an equity buy-in similarly to Loomis is in error. 
The Revenue Bonding Act (I.C. 550-1035) (interpreted in Loomis) and the Irrigation 
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District Domestic Water Revenue Act (I.C. 943-1914), both require engineer-determined plans 
and calculations. In Loomis, "the City of Hailey, after receiving an engineering report, selected a 
system in which the new user buys into a portion of the current value of the system capacity." 
Loomis, at 443-444. Hailey's system comprised a formula from which a fee was determined. 
Unlike Hailey in Loomis, the board failed to seek engineer plans, engineer cost estimates, 
project identification, or an amount as may be necessary to pay the cost of the works. Moreover 
germane to equity buy-in, neither the board, nor the advisory committee engaged an engineer, an 
accountant, or any professional to value the capital assets, to create an equity buy-in formula, to 
formulate a reasonable increase amount, or to select a system whereby a new user buys into a 
portion of the current value of the system capacity. Rohrbach Depo., Vol I, p.68,l. 24 - p. 71,l. 
7; Vol. 11, p. 62,l. 21-63,I.l. 
Instead HLID's fee resulted from a rate comparison sheet of north Idaho water suppliers 
presented to a reconvened advisory committee which met once. The first and only time the 
advisory committee met on "Rates & Connect fees" was September 1,2004, just six days before 
the board passed the increase in hook-on fees. Ex. A, pp. 132-134. The advisory committee and 
the board's decisions were impulsive. 
The rate comparison sheet listed not only what other water purveyors in the area were 
exacting as hook-on fees, but also listed an amount for HLID. Ex. A, pp. 129-130. The rate 
comparison sheet presented to the advisory committee already concluded HLID's hook-on fee 
amount should be increased from $2,200 to $2700. Ex. A, pp. 132-134. This twenty-three 
percent (23%) hike brought the fee amount to within range of the highest fee charge on the list 
for domestic sized pipe openings. The advisory committee solely based its recommended 
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increase in hook-on fees by $500 to $2,700 through sharing ideas and concerns, and comparing 
what others in the area were charging. Ex A, p. 133. According to the chairman of the board, 
Q. How did the advisory committee come up with the 
recommendation for that firstto be $2,700? 
A. As I recall, there was a comparative analysis. 
Q. And comparative between what and what? 
A. Between the rate that you see there. 
Rohrbach Deposition Vol. I, p.68,11. 3- 8, 
The board adopted the fee amount presented to it from the same rate comparison sheet. 
Rohrbach Deposition Vol. 11, p.6,11. 13- 15. The board's reliance on both the comparison sheet 
and the reconvened advisory committee is misplaced. The district court's interpretation finding 
the reliance is also misplaced. What does it matter what the others charged? Equity buy-in is 
about your own system's value. The depreciated value of your neighbors' system doesn't matler 
one iota to an equity buy-in into your own system; what the neighbors charge is irrelevant to your 
own system. There is no reason for the board to keep up with the Jones. The district court did 
not perceive measuring HLID's fee amount against its neighbors' fee amounts as an 
inappropriate basis for the board's action. 
Furthermore, the board chose a straight-line depreciation schedule for capital assets and 
accounts for new wells as a fixed asset carried on the fixed asset schedule. Meyer Depo. p.17,Il. 
3-5; Ex 9, p. 32,11.2-11. HLID's irrigation system is depreciated straight-line over fifty years and 
depreciated the bulk of the wells and improvements from 1962. Other significant well and 
improvements were depreciated from 1989, with de minimus depreciation of well-related assets 
from 1997 and 2001. As of the end of the irrigation district's fiscal year, September 30,2004, 
HLID's remaining depreciated value for wells and improvements was only $27,191. Meyer 
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Depo., Ex 9, p. 36,11.11 - 25; Ex. 11. In contrast, Appellant paid $2,700 per house in hook-on 
fees which included the $500 increase on the sixty-five houses sold prior to the fee increase but 
which had not yet closed. Sixty-five times $500 equals $32,500. In other words, Appellant alone 
paid more in just the increase in hook-on fees than the total depreciated value of the wells and 
improvements. Clearly Appellant was not charged in accordance with an equity buy-in theory. 
An outdated water management plan prepared in 2001 was apparently available at the 
advisory committee meeting. Rohrbach Depo., Vol. I, p. 100,l. 16 - p.101,1.8. The district court 
incorrectly inferred from the existence of the water management plan - which is not a part of the 
record - board compliance with engineering as required by the Act, and as Hailey did in creating 
a formula. I-Iowever at the advisory committee meeting it was only referenced to, and not 
reviewed or relied upon by the committee. Furthermore, at best the discussion at the advisory 
committee meeting, if any, viz. a. viz. the water management plan concerned projected future 
needs and replacement repairs - not the then present value of HLID's system. Rohrbach Depo., 
Vol. I, p.75,11. 12-24. 
There is not support in the record for the district court's findings the board relied "upon 
input from an engineer as to those parts of the water management plan that addressed obsolete or 
marginally functional areas, i.e., that discussed the current state of the inkastructure and the 
engineer's projected future needs for replacement or repairs." Memo. Op., p.18. There is also 
not support in the record for the district court's findings the advisory committee's and board's 
"focus was upon taking care of the existing infrastructure and the maintenance that might be 
necessary." Memo Op., p. 18. 
In any event, future needs for money to replace or repair resonates with a decreased equity 
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value and a decreased buy-in amount. The more obsolete and marginally functional the 
infrastructure, the less its value. The more new users to the system the less each should pay as a 
pro-rata amount under a formula. Following the Loomis definition of equity buy-in, the demise 
of the system and increase in use supports the conclusion the current equity value of the system 
decreased and hook-on fees should have likewise gone down. 
To the limited extent the board may have "relied on the report and recommendations of 
an advisory committee" that reliance was woefully unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. In 
Loornis, Hailey revalued the connection fee annually pursuant to the replacement value formula. 
The board simply changed the fee amount charged at a time and in an amount without any 
rational basis. The district court's conclusions the "Board then weighed these factors in 
determining the amount needed for reserves and the amount for an equity buy-in" falls short of 
calculating the current value of the system and a formula. Memo. Op., p.18. 
The district court should have analyzed the process of determining the formula as in 
Loomis. Instead it seems to have answered the question of whether it was fair to burden new 
users for increased demands on the system. The question before the district court was not simply 
whether it was fair to burden new users. The equity buy-in questions related to the process and 
method of calculating a formula rationalizing the fee amount to the depreciated value of the 
system. It further misconstrued future expenses which might become necessary to take care of 
existing infrastructure with a fee charged for the current equity value. The district court also 
further misconstrued revenue generation for financing facilities needed to serve new growth and 
development with equity value. 
The board did not calculate or determine an equity buy-in amount, but simply debated the 
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matter. Rohrbach Deposition Vol. I, p. 69,ll. 3-15. Ms. Meyer testified she did not assist the 
board in calculating the $500 increase. Meyer Depo. p. 24,11.11-13. She did not know how the 
amount was calculated. Meyev Depo. p.71,22 - p.72,1.6. Neither the September 7,2004, 
Minutes nor prior Minutes make any mention of the $500 increase or how it was determined. 
The $500 increase is not rationally related to anything. The district court's co~lclusions that the 
"Board did not choose a number for the increase in a random manner" is not supported by the 
facts in the record. As the record reflects the increase amount was already on the rate 
comparison sheet delineating its future charge which both the board and advisory committee 
blindly accepted. The board acted arbitrarily, capriciously, and below any reasonable standard. 
There is no support in the record for the district court's conclusions that the board 
considered the current value of the existing system. Comparing other water suppliers' rates is 
contrary to a determination of your o m  systems' depreciated value. By comparing what other 
water suppliers charged, the board provides evidence its decision making was contrary to and not 
based on equity buy-in at all. And in any event, there is no support in the record for the district 
court's conclusions that the charges of other water suppliers as listed on the rate comparison 
sheet were based on the value of their systems, costs to purchase equity, or a formula. There is 
no support in the record the board attempted to apportion a share of the value of the system to the 
new user through a rationally calculated fee formula. 
The district court erred as a matter of law co~lcluding the board's consideration of the 
water management plan of HLID with its infrastructure needs for maintenance, and the 
engineer's analysis regarding system repair and replacement is supportive of an equity buy-in. 
An equity buy-in is based upon a determination of the present value of the system together with a 
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formula relating the value to a fee. Since these necessary components are absent, it is clear the 
district court erred finding hook-on fee revenue generated reserves as a1 equity buy-in similarly 
to Hailey in Loomis. 
Loomis and Idaho Revenue Bonding Act Do Not Support The 
District Court's Conclusions. 
Even assuming HLID collected hook-on fees pursuant to an equity buy-in formula the 
district court still erred concluding Loomis and Revenue Bonding Act provide support for its 
legal conclusions. Simply put, in Loomis, Hailey complied with the Revenue Bonding Act, and 
in the present matter, the board did not comply &th the Act. The primary distinction between 
Loomis and the present matter relates to where each entity is in the statutory process. 
Hailey engaged an engineering firm which made plans and estimated the costs for 
carrying out the plan. Hailey passed an ordinance to put the election of revenue bond financing 
before the taxpayers, and sought and received electoral permission to issue revenue bonds. 
Hailey gave notice. Hailey passed additional ordinances issuing revenue bonds, and then issued 
revenue bonds. Hailey engaged an engineering firm to calculate the depreciated value of its 
system and to create a rational formula relating the fee pro-rata to the depreciated value. Hailey 
by ordinance then set the connection fee amount pursuant to the rational formula. 
The hoard did not seek or receive electoral permission to issue revenue bonds, did not 
pass resolutions issuing revenue bonds, and did not set a formula. The hoard did not give notice. 
LC. #43-1502; -1914. Unlike Hailey's connection fee, hook-on fees are not calculated, 
collected, budgeted, accounted, allocated, orused in conformity with the statutory scheme. 
In Loomis, the statutory issue was not whether the City of Hailey was required to hold a 
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bond election prior to enacting and imposing fees as is the case in the present matter. Rather the 
issue was related to whether a bond election was required prior to changing an already properly 
enacted and imposed fee. The Court determined voter approval to increase the connection fee in 
Loomis was not necessary. The voters had already approved revenue bond financing, bonds had 
already issued, Hailey had already adopted ordinances, and had set the fee amount according to 
an annually reviewed formula. Since the board did not seek ratepayers' vote for or against 
revenue bond financing, the district court erred interpreting Loomis to stand for the proposition in 
the present matter "that it was not necessary to have the connection fees or changes in connection 
fees approved by the voters." Memo. Op., ~117. 
In Loomis, "all revenue from the connection fees is placed in a separate special account 
and used only for replacement of existing system facilities and equipment. None of the 
connection fee generated funds are used for expansion or improvement of the existing systems, 
although reserves are accumulated periodically in both the connection fee and monthly user fee 
funds." Loomis, at 436. Hailey segregated and knew how it spent its connection-fee revenue. 
Hailey spent the revenue in compliance with a dedicated purpose as required in the Bonding 
Revenue Act. 
The board in comparison commingled hook-on fees in its general fund with assessments 
and tract fees violating the Act. Rohrbach Depo., Vol 11, p. 33,11 12-24. HLID does not know 
how or on what it spent hook-on fee revenue: "I can't answer that because they are not - I mean, 
there's no this little account is assessments and this little account is hookup fees, so when I look 
at a financial statement, I am looking at the accrual basis expenditures, and if that expenditure 
was accrued, because they are one fund, don't necessarily look to see what pot of money that's 
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coming out of." Meyer Depo. p. 65,1.22 - p.66,1.3. 
In contradiction to the clear legislative mandate in LC. 543-1907 forbidding operating 
works primarily as a source of revenue to a district, the board's primary method for obtaining 
cash reserves is through hook-on fees. Memo. Op, p.4. Hook-on fee revenue was banked in the 
general fund earmarked to be spent, and was spent on general purposes, and future improvements 
to and expansion of the system. Rohrbach Depo, Vol. 11, p. 12,l. 2 - p. 13,l. 17; p. 17,l. 20 - p. 
18,l. 3; Meyer Depo. p. 41,ll. 13-17; p. 48,l. 22 - p. SO,]. 5; p. 52,1.18 - p. 54,l. 22; Ex.9, note 
7,Ex. 11;p.40,1.8-p.43,1.13,Ex. 12,13,and14;p.61,1.18-p.68,1.8;andp.70,1.20-p.71,1. 
7. The board failed to dedicate the revenue's use. Hook-on fee revenue is "placed into the 
general fund to be utilized as the board deems fit." Rohrbach Depo., Vol. 11, p. 33,11. 12-24. 
Because Const. Art. 8, 53 forbids cities from incurring indebtedness exceeding its income 
in any one specific year without approval by two-thirds of the qualified electors, the collection 
and saving of reserves, as allowed in the Bonding Revenue Act posed an issue in Loomis about 
the appropriateness of accumulating reserves from the increased fee amount without additional 
voter approval. The Court determined Haile'y could collect the balance of revenue from 
connection fees in one year as reserves and expend them in another, for the limited purpose of 
funding replacement costs of system components in its public worlts projects without violating 
Const. Art. 8, $3, so long as, the costs are ordinary and necessary. The Court noted, ordinary and 
necessary expenses are expressly excepted from the annual expenditure limitation provision. 
Hailey's expenditures of reserves were therefore directly related to maintaining the assets 
comprising the equity. Moreover, the reserves were monies remaining only after the revenue 
bond principal and interest were paid. Furthermore, but for the issuance of revenue bonds, there 
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would have been no reserves for Hailey to accumulate. 
HLID has no revenue bond principal and interest to pay which generates fees from which 
to accumulate reserves. The purposes for which fees may be expended under the Act first 
requires an irrigation district to issue revenue bonds. LC. $43-1912. Furthermore, irrigation 
districts are forbidden from depositing revenue from the water works into a general fund unless 
and until full and adequate provision has been made for the payment of revenue bond principal 
and interest including necessary payments into a sinking fund of reserves for repayment of the 
revenue bond principal and interest. LC. 543-1912, While I.C. $43-1909 empowers irrigation 
districts to create and maintain reserves, I.C. $43-1907, expressly forbids irrigation districts from 
operating any works primarily as a source of revenue to the irrigation district. 
The board spent the revenue without a dedicated purpose in conflict with the Act. Hailey 
adopted ordinances specifically to generate fees to pay for the dedicated purposes of replacement 
of existing system facilities and equipment, and specifically forbade use of fees for expansion or 
improvement of the system. Hailey's fees were dedicated to pay for expenses set out in the 
ordinances, i.e., maintenance and replacement. Hailey's fees were not used for expansion or 
improvement of the system. The board failed to pass a resolution, regulation, rule (or an 
ordinance) to collect fees to pay for the replacement of existing system facilities and equipment. 
Both the Idaho Revenue Bonding Act applied in Loomis and the Act in the present matter 
require bond proceeds to be dedicated to a specific project. Both the Revenue Bonding Act and 
the Act in the present matter require revenue bonds to issue before fees may be collected to pay 
the revenue bond principal and interest. Both the Revenue Bonding Act and the Act require 
electoral approval of revenue bonding and indebtedness. The district court erred finding support 
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in Loomis and Revenue Bonding Act for its legal conclusions. 
There Is No Su~uort  I11 the Record For Finding Hook-on Fees Are 
Segregated In A Non-general Fund Account Dedicated For 
Maintenance And Repair. 
The district court's conclusion that the remaining portion of hook-on fees after actual 
costs for parts and labor for connecting to the system is set aside in a separate, non-general fund 
account with the state treasurer for maintenance and repair is not supported by the facts in the 
record. Memo Op., p.16. The record supports the conclusion HLID did not segregate but 
deposited hook-on fees into its general fund, and further supports the conclusion the funds were 
intended for future water works. According to Mr. Rohrbach: 
Q. Is a portion of the hook-on fees going to fund future capital 
improvements? 
A. The hook-on fee is put into the general fund. The general fund 
may be utilized to repair, rep1ace;service or operate the system 
infrastructure. 
Q. How about capital improvements like new wells, new capital 
assets? Does that come out of the general fund, as well? 
A. New wells do. 
Rohrbach Depo, Vol. 11, p.17,l. 20 - p. 18,l. 3.  
The district court's two findings, hook-on fee revenue was (I) put in a separate, non-general fund 
account, and (2) were spent on maintenance and repair are inconsistent with one another, since 
repair costs incurred on existing infrastructure are paid from general funds. 
Prior to January 1, 2002, HLID simply deposited hook-on fee revenue into its general 
checking account. Meyer Depo. p. 42,ll.l-7. After January 1,2002, the board deposited hook- 
on fee revenue into a general fund for capital improvements. Meyer Depo. p. 6,l. 24 - p. 7,l. 11; 
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p. 41,11.13-17. Since "2002, they started a Idaho local government investment pool account 
where they were putting the hookup fees. Also, they in recent years have kept some of it in the 
general account, but do make a separate accounting of that money within that account." 
Meyer Depo. p. 40,1.10 - p.42,1.11. However, the local government investment pool account 
with the state treasurer "is called capital fund on the - their trial balance for the moneys that are 
still in the general checking account but have been designated by the board for that purpose but 
are kept in the checking account for convenience." Meyer Depo. p. 55,1.16 - p.57,1.4. 
According to the April 2,2002, Minutes, "all hook up's have been going into the capital 
improvement fund for several months." Ex. A, p. 71. A review of the Secretary's Report in the 
September 16,2003, Minutes provides no indication as to which account(s) comprised hook-on 
fee revenue. Ex. A, p. 112. According to the August 3,2004, Minutes $103,493 in hook-on fees 
were in the process of being transferred into the capital improvement accounts, presumptively 
from another general fund account. Ex. A, p. 127. A review of HLID's financial accounting of 
assets entitled "Lead Schedules" shows there is no separate banking, accounting or itemization 
for hook-on fee revenue. Meyer Depo. Ex. 12, 13, and 14. As well, there is no accounting from 
which monies capital assets are purchased. Meyer Depo. p. 67,l. 23-p. 68,l. 8. 
HLID's financial records provide no indication whatsoever which account(s) comprised 
hook-on fee revenue, only hook-on fee revenue, or no hook-on fee revenue. What is clear is that 
the monies were being collected to pay for the purchase of capital assets to meet the demands of 
anticipated future growth benefitting all the lands within HLID's boundaries. The district court's 
finding that the remaining portion of hoolc-on fees is set aside in a separate, non-genera1 fund 
account with the state treasurer for maintenance and repair is not supported by the facts in the 
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record. 
The Constitutional Basis For The Revenue Bonding Act Does Not 
Exist For Irrigation Districts: Irrigation Districts Are Not Subject 
to Const. Art. 8, 63. 
Const., Art. 8, 9 3 is the basis for the Revenue Bonding Act. "The Idaho Constitution, 
art. 8, 9 3(fnl) allows mui~icipalities to impose rates and charges to provide revenue for public 
works projects, and pursuant to this section of the Constitution, the Idaho legislature enacted the 
Idaho Revenue Bond Act, codified at I.C. 950-1027 through 950-1042." Loomis, at 437-438. 
Respondent asserted, Appellant conceded, and the district court ruled the requirements of 
Const., Art. 8, 9 3 do not apply to irrigation districts, citing Jensen v. Boise-Kuna Irrigation 
Dist., 75 Idaho 133, 141,269 P.2d 755, 759 (1954). On the application of Const., Art. 8, 9 3 to 
irrigation districts, Jensen provided only dictum, however, the Court put the issue to rest in 
Barker v. Wagner, 96 Idaho 214,526 P.2d 174 (1974), finding Const., Art. 8, 9 3 does not apply 
to irrigation districts. 
The Revenue Bonding Act's constitutional basis does not exist for the Act. Since Const., 
Art. 8, 9 3 does not apply to irrigation districts, then Const., Art. 8, 9 3 can not be the basis for 
the Act. As a matter of law there appears to be no constitutional basis for the legislature to adopt 
the Act. It therefore follows that an irrigation distxict can not collect a hook-on fee pursuant to 
I.C. $43-1909(e) like Hailey did in Loomis under the Revenue Bonding Act. 
f. 
Conclusion 
The board simply collected money from new users, deposited the revenue into a general 
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fund, and spent the revenue without limitation. The board and the district coult failed to 
recognize the significant differences between the facts and law in Loomis, in particular regarding 
the concept of equity buy-in. Hailey complied with the statutory scheme in enacting a connection 
fee. The board did not. The board failed to hold an election of ratepayers, issue revenue bonds, 
or follow any of the legislative plan. Hailey's connection fee apportions a share value of the 
system to the new user, HLID's does not. The district court erred finding hook-on fees are a 
method for new users to buy a portion of the system's equity. The hook-on fee amount is 
inequitable, arbitrary, and capricious. Because hook-on fees are not calculated, collected, 
budgeted, accounted, allocated, or used pursuantto its police powers or in conformity with the 
Act (or simply because the Const., art. 8, 5 3 does not allow irrigation districts to impose rates 
and charges to provide revenue for water works projects), the district court misinterpreted 
Loomis and equity buy-in, and furthermore erred as a matter of law failing to find the collection 
of hook-on fees from new users as an impermissible tax. Bvewster v. City of Pocatello, 115 
Idaho 502,768 P.2d 765 (1989). 
The District Court Failed To Appreciate The Fundamental 
Concept In State And Federal Irrigation District Law, 
Irrigation Districts' Costs Are Assessed Against The Property 
Benefitted, Proportionately and Ratably. 
"Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation 
Act, for the use of the landowners. . . and the water rights became the property of the 
landowners." Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95, 57 S.Ct. 412,416-417. "[Tlhere is a statutory duty to 
furnish water under the Carey Act, and upon the payment of the rentals and tolls for the operation 
and maintenance of the system for the irrigating season of 1916, it is the duty of the company to 
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furnish the water." Adams v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 357, 161 P. 322 
((1916)), citing Mandell v. Sun Diego etc. Co., 89 Fed 295; San Diego etc. Co. v. Sharp, 97 Fed. 
394, 38 C.C.A. 220). Hook-on fees interfere with landowners' appurtenant water rights by 
depriving access to water unless a hook-on fee is paid. 
The costs of developing, constructing, reconstructing, operating, maintaining, replacing 
and the other expenses related to irrigation district's capital assets was assessed initially and 
continuously against the total land within the irrigation district, and the total land benefitted. 
Regardless of whether the total land benefitted was subdivided, the subdivided land was part of 
the initial total land benefitted and assessed. The value of that portion of the system capacity that 
a "new user" will utilize was already assessed against the prior ratepayer owning the same land 
before it was subdivided. 
The equity buy-in concept against new users should not apply to an irrigation district's 
new ratepayer, because the previous landowner ratepayer already paid for the system's total 
equity value. While there is equity in the previously constructed infrastructure for a new user in 
a city to buy into, there is no land within the district which had not already paid for previously 
constructed infrastructure by the prior ratepayer owner of the same land. The earlier ratepayers 
on behalf of the new lot owners already paid for each square inch pro-rata costs in developing the 
water works. 
Assume an irrigation district was comprised of ten thousand acres. Further assume that 
two people (A and B) owned five thousand acres each at the time the irrigation district assessed 
the two ratepayers $500,000 jointly for the total cost of a new well benefitting all ten thousand 
acres. A and B each paid $250,000. The ten thousand acres was burdened with the cost of the 
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new well, and the ten thousand acres is therefore credited with all the equity in the well. If A 
subdivides his five thousand acres into one hundred separate parcels of fifty acres each, it does 
not change the fact that the land benefitted had already paid the costs of acquiring the equity in 
the well. Each of the fifty acre parcels is still credited with its pro-rata share of the equity in the 
well. If there is a subsequent sale of a fifty acre parcel, then the credited equity and benefits of 
water still run with the land. 
There are fundamental philosophical differences between irrigation districts and cities. 
Pursuant to municipal law, cities may charge new users for connecting to its water system, but 
the city resident or taxpayer has no property interest in the water. Hailey required connection and 
use of the water and sewer systems as opposed to wells and septic systems. An irrigation district 
can not force its water use upon the ratepayer, and a ratepayer must pay assessments even if 
irrigation district supplied water is not used. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. Peiper, 133 
Idaho 82,91,982 P.2d 917,926 (1999). 
Under irrigation district law (but not city law) the landowners have a property interest in 
the water held in trust by the inigation district for the landowners. Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82,95, 
57 S.Q. 412, 416-417. Under irrigation district law (not city law) beneficial use shall be the sole 
basis, measure, and limit of the right. "The Reclamation Act provides that 'the right to the use of 
water acquired under the provisions of this Act shall be appurtenant to the land irrigated, and 
beneficial use shall be the basis, measure, and limit of the right.' 43 U.S.C. 3 372." United States 
v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007). 
The board's hook-on fee exacted from new users is not related to beneficial use or 
determined with regard to the basis, measure, or limit of the right. "After an irrigation district's 
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works have been completed, as in this case, the cost of the maintenance and operation, whether 
collected by means of assessments or tolls, 'shall be spread upon all the lands of the district and 
shall be proportionate to the benefits received by such lands growing out of the maintenance and 
operations of the said works of said district.' " Gedney v. Snake River Irrigation District, 61 
Idaho 605,104 P.2d 909 (1940), citing I.C. $ 5  42-701,42-905, and 43-1901 et seq. Benefits and 
costs must be apportioned at the same rate as other users where the water needed and made 
available is the same. Little v.   am pa-~eridian brigation District, 82 Idaho 167, 350 P.2d 740 
(1960). "Where the benefits are uniform the assessment must be uniform and in this connection 
the amount of water delivered is the benefit. Thus, where the amount of delivery of the water is 
uniform, the assessment must be uniform." Id., citing Gedney v. Snake River Irrigation District 
and Brown v. Shupe, 40 Idaho 252,233 P. 59 (1924). 
Permitting the exaction of hook-on fees against new users eviscerates the concept of 
paying ratably in proportion to the benefits received which permeates irrigation district law. 
"The irrigation system is a unit, to be, and intended to be, operated and maintained by the use of 
a common fund, to which all the lands under the system are required to contribute ratably, 
without regard to benefits specifically and directly received from each detail to which the fund is 
from time to time devoted." Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Bond, 268 U.S. 50 (1925). Hook- 
on fees collected only against new users defeais the principles of cooperation on which irrigation 
district law is based. "It could not have been the legislative intention to create two methods of 
raising money for maintenance and operation of a completed irrigation system in an irrigation 
district, one by assessment which must be uniform according to benefits received, and the other 
by tolls which need not be uniform nor based onbenefits received, but may be based on cost of 
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delivery of water." Gedney v. Snake River Ivy. Dist., 61 Idaho 605, 104 P.2d 909 (1940). 
Also permeating irrigation district law are the legislative requirements for notice, 
electoral approval prior to encumbering the lands with indebtedness, planning, expenses to be 
spread upon all the lands, expenses to be proportionate to benefits, and for expenses to be 
charged ratably. Idaho Code $43-401A, for instance, authorizes board of directors to reconstruct, 
rehabilitate or replace works belonging to the district or to the United States necessary to the 
delivery of water appurtenant to land within the district. However a board of directors must first 
determine the necessity and cost of such proposed iinprovements and determine what amount of 
money needs to be raised. The board of directors must call a special election for electors to 
decide whether or not bonds in the amount as determined should be authorized. With approval 
the board of directors must still adhere to the remaining provisions in Title 43, including issuing 
bonds based upon the work proposed, and applying the bond proceeds to the costs of the work. 
Benefits and costs must also still be apportioned, and the amount apportioned must be the basis 
for fixing the annual assessments levied against the land. LC. $43-404. 
Idaho Code $43-701(4), for instance, authorizes the board of directors to determine the 
aggregate amount necessary to be raised for all purposes connected with the maintaining and 
operating of the works in a district.   ow ever, the amount of assessment designated for operation 
and maintenance (maintained in a separate fund) must be spread upon all the lands in the district 
and be proportionate to the benefits received by such lands growing out of the maintenance and 
operation of the works of the irrigation district. 
Idaho Code Title 43, Chapter 18 concerns financing construction of works through 
contracts with the United States provides, yet another example. According to I.C. $43-1824 an 
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assessment must be based upon the number of acre-feet of water delivered. According to LC. 
543-1832 benefits must be apportioned. Ratepayers must vote approving a contract with the 
federal government to fund construction works. LC. 543-1808. 
These statutes and others, including but not limited to the Act, consistently require costs 
of construction, maintenance, improvements, and delivery of water to be ratably charged in 
proportion to the benefits received after planning, notice and electoral approval. The district 
court's interpretation of I.C. $43-1909(e) without construing it with the rest of the Title 43 
violates principles of statutory construction. Webb v. Webb, 143 Idaho 521, 525, 148 P.3d 1267, 
1271 (2006). Statutes that are inpavi materia, i.e., relating to the same subject, must be 
construed together to give effect to legislative intent. Johnson v. McPhee, 2009-ID-0409.179, 
citing Paolini v. Albertson's Inc., 143 Idaho 547,.549, 149 P.3d 822, 824 (2006); Union Pacific 
R.R. Co. v. Bd. of Tax Appeals, 103 Idaho 808,811,654 P.2d 901,904 (1982). 
The district court's interpretation defeats the policy behind the irrigation district statutes 
for the distribution and use of water ratably and proportionately. Because the right to water use 
is appurtenant to the land, the prior ratepayers already paid for the equity value of the system. 
The district court erred reading an ability to exact fees non-proportionately, without a plan of 
construction, without notice, and without electoral approval. 
The District Court Erred As A Matter Of Law Concluding The 
Board's Collection Of Hook-on Fees Were Collected Pursuant 
To And In Accordance With The Statutory Authority To 
Establish Initial Equitable Bylaws. 
LC. $43-304 empowers the board of directors to establish equitable bylaws. The board 
adopted HLID's bylaws in1915. Ex. A, p. 9. The 1915 bylaws and subsequent bylaws state the 
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board may unilaterally amend, repeal, and adopt new bylaws. In 1947, the board unilaterally 
amended the bylaws adding an ability for the board to charge hook-on fees in its sole discretion. 
The district court erred interpreting LC. $43-304 to allow revenue generation through the bylaws. 
The district court further erred interpreting I.C. $43-304 empowered the board to amend its 
bylaws through the bylaws. 
The district court read LC. $43-304 overly broad finding more in the statute than the 
literal language. "Our inquiry begins and ends with the plain language of the statute. When this 
Court interprets a statute, it begins with the literal words of the statute, giving those words their 
plain, usual, and ordinary meaning. McLean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho 810,8 13, 
135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Additionally, this court must construe the statute as a whole." Black 
Labrador Investing, LLC v. Kuna City Council, Docket No. 34513. (2009)., Id. "When 
interpreting a statute, we will construe the statute as a whole to give effect to the legislative 
intent." George W. Watkins Family v. Messenger, 11 8 Idaho 537, 539-40,797 P.2d 1385, 
1387-88 (1990). "The plain meaning of a statute will prevail unless clearly expressed legislative 
intent is contrary or unless plain meaning leads to absurd results." Id. "The interpretation of a 
statute is an issue of law over which we exercise free review." Corder v. Idaho Farmway, Inc., 
133 Idaho 353,358,986 P.2d 1019,1024 (Ct. App. 1999). 
Statutory Construction Does Not Supoort Legislative 
Empowerment In LC. 643-304 For The Board To Amend The 
Bvlaws And To Generate Revenue Through The Bylaws. 
Bylaw is defined as, "rule or administrative provision adopted by an organization for its 
internal governance and its external dealings." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 213 (8th ed 
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2004). Bylaws are generally concerned with the operation of the entity, setting out the manner 
the entity must be run, such as how directors are elected and how meetings of directors are 
conducted. Usually a super majority of owners' votes are required for amendment and bylaws 
usually cannot be unilaterally amended by an entity's board of directors unless the board of 
directors and the entity's owners are one in the same. Furthermore, revenue generation concerns 
neither internal governance, nor external dealings. 
The legislature neither granted irrigation district board of directors specific authority, nor 
general authority to create amendable bylaws. The legislature did provide specific authority to be 
exercised by board of directors in its sole discretion in some areas of irrigation district law. 
However, the legislature did not provide boards of directors general or specific authority in its 
sole discretion to remove project financing decisions from ratepayers. 
For instance, boards of directors have specific authority from the legislature to construct 
and levy assessments for drainage works pursuant to LC. $43-306. Nonetheless, the legislature 
retained power in ratepayers to decide whether to encumber their land. LC. $ 5  43-321, -329, - 
401, and -401A. If a board of directors is empowered to levy an assessment for connection to the 
system, then that power is contingent on ratepayer electoral approval. LC. $543-1905, -704. It 
makes no sense for the legislature to specifically provide financing through revenue bonds after 
electoral-ratepayer approval, and then turn around and allow financing by fiat through bylaw 
changes especially when the revenue bond financing statutes provide due process. 
The district court implied the power to amend bylaws from the word "establish" in I.C. 
543-304. The express language, however, says nothing about amending bylaws. The plain, 
usual, and ordinsuy meaning of the word "establish" means more than just "adopt" or "create." 
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The plain meaning of the word "establish" means "adopt" or "create," plus to make permanent. 
Yet, the 1915 established bylaws state the board inay amend, repeal, and adopt new bylaws 
unilaterally without notice. 
Because the statute does not define "establish," the Court applies the plain meaning of the 
term. Jones v. Healthsouth Treasure Valley Hospital, 2009-ID-0202.164, Docket #33905. The 
plain meaning of "establish" is to "settle, make or fix firmly; to enact permanently." BLACK'S 
LAW DICTIONARY 566 (7th ed 1999). Idaho Code $43-304 does not say establish "initial" 
bylaws, which at least might lead to ambiguity about whether the legislature really meant for 
non-fixed bylaws. Afier all the legislature specifically used the term "initial" concerning 
corporation bylaws, as follows: "BYLAWS: (1) The incorporators or board of directors of a 
corporation shall adopt initial bylaws for the corporation." (emphasis added). Idaho Business 
Corporation Act, I.C. $30-1-206. The use of the word "establish" without modieing the word 
"bylaw" by the word "initial" indicates legislative intent to create permanent irrigation district 
bylaws. There is no clearly expressed legislation empowering the board of directors to amend 
bylaws in LC. $43-304. 
The literal words of LC. $43-304 say nothing about allowing revenue generation through 
the bylaws either. Construing I.C. $43-304 internally does not lead to an interpretation LC. $43- 
304 allows revenue generation through the bylaws. Furthennore construing I.C. $43-304 with 
Title 43 as whole does not lead to an interpretation I.C. 343-304 allows revenue generation 
through the bylaws. LC. $43-304 should be interpreted to be internally consistent with the rest of 
the sections in Title 43 addressing the financing of works. 
Idaho Code Title 43 specifically describes the scope and limit of irrigation district 
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funding. It does not support the proposition that bylaws are the proper vehicle for exacting 
charges or otherwise financing irrigation districts. If LC. $43-304 allows revenue generation 
through bylaws, there would have been no reason for the legislature to pass the Act. Finding 
authority in the bylaws to charge hook-on fees renders all the other revenue-related sections 
meaningless. If bylaws can be amended unilaterally to the point financing an irrigation district is 
available, then there is no limit to what can be accomplished unilaterally through bylaws. 
If in construing Chapter 3 of Title 43 as a whole leads to the interpretation I.C. $43-304 
allows revenue generation through bylaws, then I.C. $43-321 would be rendered superfluous. 
This section of Chapter 3 empowers the board of directors to "call a special election and submit 
to the qualified electors of the district the question whether or not a special assessment shall be 
levied for the purpose of raising money to be applied to any of the purposes provided in this 
title." LC. $43-321. To the extent the board found a purpose which needed funding, it could 
have called for a special election of the ratepayers (protecting due process rights). 
Interpreting I.C. $43-304 to allow revenue generation through the bylaws negates a reason 
for the legislature to pass LC. $43-305 (allowing to pay the cost of drainage works to be paid for 
out of the maintenance, operation charges, tolls, or assessments), I.C. $43-306 (allowing the 
board of directors by resolution to levy an assessment in order to pay the cost of drainage works), 
or I.C. $43-315 (allowing the board of directors by resolution to levy an assessment in order to 
pay the cost of exterminating rodents). 
Idaho Code $43-304 does not recite language providing board of directors power to raise 
revenue in the bylaws. Interpreting it to allow revenue generation renders the rest of the sections 
in Title 43 addressing financing works internally inconsistent. The district court misconstrued 
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LC. $43-304 finding authorization for amending bylaws and for charging fees in the bylaws. 
b. 
The Bylaws Violate Due Process. 
HLID's bylaws do not provide proper and adequate notice to ratepayers, or an 
opportunity for the ratepayers to be heard. "The purpose of these requirements is not only 'to 
ensure abstract fair play to the individual' but to also protect the individual's use and possession 
of property from arbitrary encroachment. Id. at 81,92 S.Ct. at 1994." Dufur v. Nampa & 
Meridian Irr. Dist., 128 Idaho 319,912 P.2d 687 (Ct.App.1996), citing to Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 
U.S. 67,81-82,92 S.Ct. 1983, 1994-95,32 L.Ed.2d 556 (1972). As implemented, HLID's 
bylaws empower the board to encumber the ratepayers' land without notice or an opportunity to 
be heard. Quasi-governmental entity bylaws which violate due process are inequitable bylaws. 
They lead to unjust results. The district court erred finding the bylaws are valid. 
"Due process issues are generally questions of law, over which this Court exercises free 
review. Id. The identification of the specific dictates of due process generally requires 
consideration of three distinct factors: the private interest that will be affected by the official 
action; the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used, and the 
probative value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and the government's 
interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the 
additional or substitute requirements would entail. Id." Rammell v. Idaho State Department of 
Agriculture, 2009-ID-0602.1 12, citing Spencer v. Kootenai Counly, 145 Idaho 448,454, 180 
P.3d 487,493 (2008). "An essential principle of due process is notice of the issues to be 
considered and the opportunity for an appropriate hearing before being deprived of a significant 
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property interest." Idaho State Bar v. Everard, 142 Idaho 109,115, 124 P.3d 985 (2005), citing 
Cleveland Ed. ofEduc. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532,105 S.Ct. 1487,84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). 
The board granted itself the ability, in its sole discretion, to amend the bylaws. The board 
unilaterally amended the bylaws to include hook-on fees and the increases. The board deprived 
Appellant of its significant private property interest in the use of water appurtenant to its land. 
Use of water the board holds in trust for Appellant's benefit. The board took the significant 
private property interests of the value in Appellant's lots and homes, the loss of use of water, and 
the money exacted as hook-on fees. The board acted without providing adequate notice and an 
opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
The risk was very high of an erroneous deprivation of Appellant's interest through the 
unilateral procedures used. Allowing bylaw amendment in the bylaws does not require prior 
notice even to the board if the directors are in agreement to amend. Thus there is no cooling off 
period or opportunity to deliberate. The board would not have been burdened significantly had it 
provided notice by publication, put the issue to ratepayer vote, attempted a revenue bonding, or 
allowed ratepayers the opportunity to be heard as established by I.C. $543-321, -1502, -1914, and 
42-2401. The board arbitrarily deprived Appellant of its procedural due process rights amending 
bylaws at whim, and failing to provide procedural safeguards of notice and an opportunity to be 
heard. Appellant's use and possession of property was not protected from arbitrary 
encroachment. 
The risk was also extremely high for an erroneous deprivation of Appellant's interest 
through the arbitrary and capricious fee amount exacted. As stated above, no procedures existed 
for calculating the amount, and no calculations by an engineer were made as to the amount of 
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money reasonably and rationally related to the objectives of the district. A, p. 142. Thus the 
manner in which the amount was derived is unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious. No capital 
improvement project plan was created. Thus there was no basis for aniving at the $500 increase 
or the $2,700 hook-on fee. 
The board arbitrarily deprived Appellant of its substantive due process rights as well. 
Substantive due process requires the governmental action must bear a reasonable relationship to a 
permissible objective. The reason for the deprivation must not be so inadequate that it may be 
characterized as an arbitrary exercise of state police powers. Spencer v. Kootenai County, 145 
Idaho 448,454, 180 P.3d 487,493 (2008). (citations omitted). 
The reason reflected in the record for collecting hook-on fees was to fund future growth. 
The argument given at summary judgment (attempting to position the official action within 
Loomis) was: "These fees are utilized specifically to maintain the existing infrastructure and keep 
it viable, and not allow it to become defunct." P1. SJ. Memo., pp. 14-15. Either way, there is no 
reasonable relationship to any permissible legislative objective. Hook-on fees are not reasonably 
related to the overall benefit provided by HLID as a whole. Aberdeen-Springfield Canal Co. v. 
Peiper, 133 Idaho 82,91, 982 P.2d 917,926 (1999). Instead the fees imposed are a disguised 
tax, neither uniformly nor proportionately applied. Idaho Bldg Contractors Ass'n v. City of 
Coeur d'Alene, 126 Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 (1995). 
The imposition of hook-on fees constitutes an unconstitutionaI taking of property under 
the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment made applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment 
and Art. I, 5 10 of the Constitution of the United States, and Const. Art. I, 5 14. The board was 
arbitrary and capricious establishing bylaws providing in itself power to amend the bylaws, 
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amending the bylaws, permitting hook-on fees in the bylaws, and collecting hook-on fees. It is 
an abuse of governmental power. The bylaws provide no notice or opportunity to be heard. 
The Board Violated Appellant's Equal Protection Rights. 
Different treatment to new ratepayers at the whim of the board is contrary to the 
uniformity and proportionality of treatment required of government. Appellant belongs to the 
class of new rate paying lot owners precluded from water service unless a hook-on fee is paid. 
Strict scrutiny is the standard since the board burdened fundamental rights to own property. 
Tarbox v. Idaho Tau Commission, 107 Idaho 957,959,961,695 P.2d 342,344,346 (1984); 
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,470,97 S.Ct. 2376,2380,53 L.Ed.2d 484,492 (1977); State v. 
Mowrey, 134 Idaho 751,754-55,9 P.3d 1217, 1220-21 (2000). Because there is no indication of 
a relationship between the classification (new users) and the purpose (to fund new growth), it is 
apparent a bylaw derived hook-on fee is discriminatory against new rate paying lot owners. 
There are less discriminatory methods available to achieve the goal of generating revenue. 
Differential treatment between new users and other rate paying landowners is an equal protection 
violation. 
The board has a history of treating different ratepayers differently waiving both 
assessments and hook-on fees capriciously. The following are examples for illustration: 
. Friends Church's assessments were waived by the district Ex. A, pp. 73,94-95 
(Resolution dated February 18,2003). 
Developers received a credit for hook-on fees, even though hook-on fees are paid by 
builder ratepayers. Ex. A, , pp.81-84,86-87,89-90, and 73A-73B, 124 (Resolutions 02- 
002 rescinded by 04-004). 
. Delbert Ken and John Sperle received waivers of hook-on fees. Ex. A, p. 39 and pp. 
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. A dedicated fund to assist developers, ostensibly h d e d  by some but not all developers 
in the district, which are not funded by developers at all, but by builders tlrough 
establishment of so-called "capitalization and hook-on fees." Ex. A, , p. 128. 
. Some multi-family projects paid one hook-on fee while others paid a hook-on fee per 
dwelling unit in the project. Aff. Ex. A, pp. 68-69, 122-124. 
Some prior hook-on fees were "transferred" while others were not. Aff. Ex. A, pp. 85-92. 
. For those ratepayers who live in a house built before August 20, 1947, no hook-on fee 
was charged at all. 
. Mr. Sperle (a developer) wanted a credit instead of a transfer, and though it is not clear 
whether or not he received a credit some developer(s) did. Aff. Ex. A, , pp.110-112. 
. At least one developer received a special financial reimbursement out of hook-on fees for 
its obligatory costs associated with setting meter boxes. Aff. Ex. A, pp. 114-1 16. 
Developers now receive reimbursements for meter sets (new capital assets) out of hook- 
on fees. Aff. Ex. A, pp. 114, 128. 
Differential treatment between new user and current user rate paying landowners is an 
equal protection violation. There are less discriminatory methods available to achieve the goal of 
amending bylaws and generating revenue, than doing so in the bylaws. The District violates new 
users' equal protection and due process rights. 
d. 
Amendinz The Bylaws And Exacting Fees In The Bylaws Are Ultra Vires Acts. 
Adoption of the subsequent bylaws constitute ultra vires acts. Furthermore the exaction 
of hook-on fees through the bylaws constitute ultra vires acts. "Under the provisions of C. S., 
secs. 4346 and 4355, the power of the directors or other officers of an irrigation district is limited 
and any act done in excess of the express or implied provisions of the statute by such directors or 
other officers is ultra vires." "Idaho Code $43-304 sets out the general powers of the board of 
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directors of the Irrigation District and Abbotts cite Yaden v. Gem Irrigation Dist., 37 Idaho 300, 
216 P. 250 (1923), for the proposition that when the board of directors acts in excess of its 
authority then such actions are void to the extent that the actions depart from that authority." 
Abbott v. Nampa Sch. Dist. No. 131, 119 Idaho 544, 547,808 P.2d 1289, 1292 (1991). 
An attempt by the board of directors of an irrigation district to unilaterally amend bylaws 
through the bylaws, and to create subsequent bylaws, and to exact hook-on fees through those 
amended bylaws interferes with the public policy behind the dedication of water to the lands. It 
thwarts the will and purposes the legislature intended in Title 43. Such actions exceed the 
board's authority and should be voided. The district court erred finding the board acted within its 
authority. 
e. 
Conclusion. 
The Idaho legislature requires irrigation districts to establish fair and equitable bylaws. 
Going beyond the general powers granted board of directors constitutes ultra vires acts. The 
legislature did not provide a mechanism in Title 43 for amending bylaws, and by statutory 
construction it is clear the legislature did not intend for irrigation district bylaws to be amended 
to allow revenue generation. Board of directors of quasi-municipal corporations are not immune 
from the requirement to protect due process and equal protection rights. The district court erred 
as a matter of law finding the imposed hook-on fees were valid charges pursuant to equitable 
bylaws. Articles 8,9, and 18 of the 2002 Amended Bylaws should be declared null and void 
from their inception as ultra vires acts. 
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5. 
The District Court Erred Finding Idaho Constitution Article 15 Inapplicable. 
The district court correctly identified Constitution Article 15 as addressing water rights. 
However there is no analysis, rationale, or basis put forth supporting the district court's 
conclusion Const. Art. 15, $5 2 ,4  and 5 do not apply. Memo Op., p. 10. Const. Art. 15, $5 2,4 
and 5 apply because the district holds title to the water rights in trust for the landowners as the 
water right perfected is appurtenant to the land which receives the benefit of the water. 
Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift Irr. Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 381 P.2d 440 (1963); I.C. 5 42-101; 43 
U.S.C. 372; United States v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007); I.C. 
543-3 16. The exaction of a hook-on fee is a deprivation ofthe constitutionally protected water 
use right, as well as, a deprivation of due or any process. 
a. 
Constitution Article 15. 64. 
Appellant, as a subsequent land owner within HLID's boundaries acquired the guarantees 
to domestic water under Const., Art. 15, $ 5  4 and 5. Nampa &Meridian Zrr. Dist. v. Barclay, 56 
Idaho 13,47 P.2d 916, 100 A.L.R. 557. Bradshaw v. Milner Low Lift b r .  Dist., 85 Idaho 528, 
381 P.2d 440 (1963). Appellant's interest in receiving the benefits of decreed water rights are 
appurtenant to Appellant's lands because the waters were beneficially applied upon the land. 
Idaho Const. Art. 15, 5 4; I.C. $5 42-101 and 55-101; Hall v. Blackman, 8 Idaho 272,68 P. 19; 
Paddock v. Clark, 22 Idaho 498, 126 P. 1053; Zreton v. Idaho Irrigation Co., 30 Idaho 3 10, 164 
P. 687; Twin Falls Canal Co. v. Shippen, 46 Idaho 787,271 P. 578; Beecher v. Cassia CreekZrr. 
Co., 66 Idaho 1, 154 P.2d 507. 
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If hook-on fees are not paid, building permits will neither issue, nor will landowners be 
able to connect into the water system. Water use rights run with the land, and the land it runs 
with is all the real property located within the irrigation district's boundaries. New landowner 
ratepayers must not be denied their share of the appurtenant water rights, but for the non-payment 
of the annual assessment. Const., Art. 15, 5 4. Each new user in the district is entitled to water 
for being geographically located within the district's boundaries. The board is depriving new 
users of their right to the use of water even though there was no failure to pay the ordinary 
charges or assessments to cover the actual expenses incurred for the maintenance, operation and 
any other necessary expense incident to the delivery of water. 
"Appropriation was made not for the use of the government, but, under the Reclamation 
Act, for the use of the landowners. . . and the water rights became the property of the 
landowners." Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82, 95, 57 S.Ct. 412,416-417. "There is a statutory duty to 
furnish water under the Carey Act, and uponthe payment of the rentals and tolls for the operation 
and maintenance of the system for the irrigating season of 1916, it is the duty of the company to 
furnish the water." Adams v. Twin fills-Oakley Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 357, 161 P. 322 
((1916)), citing Mandell v. Sun Diego etc. Co., 89 Fed 295; Sun Diego etc. Co. v. Sharp, 97 Fed. 
394,38 C.C.A. 220). "From a careful consideration of the foregoing statutory provisions, it 
would seem to be clear that the legislature never intended to authorize persons, associations or 
corporations engaged in the delivery of water for the irrigation of the arid lands of this state to 
deprive the citizens of the state of the right to the use of such waters, except upon their failure to 
pay the ordinary charges or assessments to cover the actual expenses incurred for the 
maintenance, operation and any other necessary expense incident to the delivery of such water." 
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Adams v. Twin Falls-Oakley Land & Water Co., 29 Idaho 357,373, 161 P. 322 (1916). 
Hook-on fees interfere with landowners' appropriated appurtenant water rights by 
depriving annual use of water unless a hook-on fee is paid. Hook-on fees neither cover the 
expenses for delivery of water, nor are they ordinary charges and assessments. Hook-on fees are 
an unconstitutional deprivation of appropriated appurtenant water use. The district court erred as 
a matter of law finding Const., Art. 15, $4 is not applicable. 
b. 
Constitution Article 15, 65. 
Const., Art. 15, $5 provides priority in time shall give superiority of right to the use of 
water. The use of the water is upon all the land within the district's boundaries and not upon the 
individual lots. The land within the district's boundaries is on equal priority with all the other 
land in the district's boundaries. Denying water to a new user on lands already within the 
irrigation district's boundaries unless a hoolc-on fee is paid denies that new user's priority 
position. The district court erred as a matter of law finding Const., Art. 15, $5 does not apply in 
this case. 
C. 
Constitution Article 15, 62. 
The State of Idaho granted HLID a franchise which "can not be exercised except by 
authority of and in tlie manner prescribed by law." The term "franchise" has been interpreted to 
mean a grant of a right to use property over which the granting authority has control. 36 Am. Jur. 
2d Franchises $ 1. Alpert v. Boise Water Corp., 118 Idaho 136,795 P.2d 298 (1990). The right 
to collect money for supplying water for the domestic use of the inhabitants is a franchise, and 
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can be exercised only in the manner provided by law. Const. Art. 15, $2. Rowland v. Kellogg 
Power Co., 43 Idaho 643,253 Pac. 840 (1927). 
The franchise does not grant power to charge ratepayers for the right to the use of water 
except: ratably, accessing according to the proportionate benefit received, and with the beneficial 
use the sole basis, measure, and limit of the right. 43 U.S.C. $ 372; United States v. Pioneer 
Irr. DDi, 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (2007). The board collects hook-on fees non-ratably, 
disproportionately from use, and in an amount beyond the sole basis, measure, and limit granted. 
The district court's conclusion that Constitution, Art. 15, $2 does not apply is in error as a matter 
of law. 
The District Court Erred Finding No Violation Of Idaho 
Constitution Article 7, $3 6,5 ,  and 2. 
Without the board being invested with the power to tax, hook-on fees violate Const. Art. 
7, $6. 
Idaho Const. Art. 7, $ 5 requires uniform taxation. Only new ratepayers are charged 
hook-on fees. Prior users are not required to make a capital investment into the general fund for 
unidentified future expansion of the water system. Prior users are not required to make a capital 
investment for upgrades to meet inore stringent governmental standards for the water system. 
Hook-on fees are a tax not uniformly levied and therefore can not stand. 
Idaho Const. Art. 7, $2 requires proportional taxing. Only new users are charged a hook- 
on fee. Other users in HLID are not paying a hook-on fee tax (for capital investment into the 
general h d  for unidentified future expansion of the water system or for upgrades to meet more 
stringent governmental standards for the water system) proportional to the value their property. 
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Hook-on fee amounts are not set in proportion to the value of property. Since the tax is not 
proportionately levied it cannot stand. 
Hook-on fees cannot be sustained as a tax. "What can not be done directly because of 
constitutional limitations cannot be accomplished indirectly." O'Bvyant v. The City of Ida60 
Falls, 78 Idaho 3 13, 303 P.2d 672 (1956). The district court erred as a matter of law finding 
HLID did not violate Const. Art., VII, $5 6, 5 and 2. 
7. 
Contracts With The United States. 
The district court erred as a matter of law finding: 
. Some portions of the water system are not encumbered by the contracts with the United 
States. 
. The United States held no interest in the infrastructure. 
The contracts authorized collection of reserves for general purposes in the amount and 
manner in which HLID generates revenue. 
The "limitations in the contracts related only to irrigation waters, which are separate from 
the connection fees for the domestic water system." Memo. Op., p. 21. 
There is no analysis, rationale, or basis put forth supporting these findings, and they are not 
supported by the facts in the record, in particular, the clear language in the contracts. 
HLID entered into contracts with The United States for financing improvement and 
replacement of the water distribution system on: (1) February 16, 1949, (2) April 20, 1957, (3) 
March 19, 1962, and (4) September 30, 1977. Ex. C, pp. 1 - 4. The contracts' terns are still in 
effect and binding, and will continue to be so even after repayment. The 1957, contract is still in 
repayment and its terms incorporated terms of the 1949 contract, and both the 1962 and 1977 
contracts incorporated relevant terms of the 1957 contract. 
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The contracts vested title to all of district's system to The United States, including the 
distribution system. Ex. C 1, Art. 23, pp. 14-15 (1949 contract), C 2, Art. 22, p. 16 (1957 
contract); C 3, Art. 12, pp. 9-10 (1962 contract); and C 4, Art. 14, p. 6 (1977 contract). 
According to the 1977 contract, "Title to the Emergency Works developed and constructed in 
accordance with this contract shall be and remain vested in the United States and shall become 
part of the Rathdrum Project, the same as other project works covered under Repayment Contract 
No. 14-06-100-1 182 between the District and the United States dated April 20, 1957." Ex. C 4 
Art. 14 p. 6 (1977 contract). Clearly if the United States holds title to HLID's entire irrigation 
system, the district court erred finding some portions of HLID's water system are not 
encumbered by the contracts with the United States, the United States had no interest in the 
infrastructure, and limitations in the contracts related only to irrigation waters. Besides providing 
no analysis why the clear language of the contract should be ignored, the 1977 contract was 
entered specifically for developing a well to connect to HLID's existing system.' Ex. C 4, p. 2. 
The reserve fmd limiting language in the contracts is found in Article1 3(b) of the 1949 
and 1957 contracts. Ex. C-2, pp. 11-12; Ex. C-1, p.9. Articles 13@) limits annual accumulation 
of a reserve f w d  to no more than four thousand dollars ($4,000). The contracts further limits 
availability of the reserve fund to meet emergency costs of operation and maintenance in excess 
of the District's normal operating and maintenance costs, but only after advance notice of the 
proposed use is given in writing to the Secretary of the Interior. Under the contracts reserve 
funds may also only be used to meet extraordinary and unforeseen operation and maintenance 
'Exhibit A to the 1977 contract at the second paragraph required the highest quality level 
of water attainable, presumptively for domestic use. 
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costs when the use of the fund is approved in advance by the Secretary of the Interior. The 
contracts further require reserve funds be maintained segregated from other funds. 
The September 2004 year ending hook-on fee revenue of $619,120 and the September 
2005 year ending hook-on fee revenue of $1,352,950 exceed the contract cap of $4,000. Meyer 
Depo. Ex. 9, p.3. Furthermore, there are no facts in the record hook-on fees were: 
. Spent on emergency costs of operation and maintenance, or dedicated for a particularly 
proposed use. 
. Spent on extraordinary and unforeseen operation and maintenance costs, or dedicated for 
a particularly proposed use. 
. Maintained apart from its other hnds. 
As well, there are no facts in the record of advance notice provided in writing to the Secretary of 
the Interior for any proposed use of hook-on fee reserves. The district court erred finding 
authorization within the contracts for the board to collect hook-on fee generated reserves for 
general purposes in the amount and manner in which HLID generated and banked revenue. 
Pursuant to 1957, 1962, and 1977 contracts, the board charged residential "operating 
units" a uniform tract charge, when taken together with the acreage charge, to meet all its 
expenses of the district. Ex. C 2-4; 1957 Contract, Art. 12; 1962 Contract, Art. 12; and 1977 
Contract Art. 15; Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546,589, 83 S.Ct. 1468, 1492-93 (1963); 43 
U.S.C. Sections 491,498; United States v. Pioneer Irr. Dist., 144 Idaho 106, 157 P.3d 600 (Idaho 
2007)). "Tract fee . . . reflects the bureau's recognition that portions of the district were suburban 
and that those higher density areas, in terms of population, received greater benefit from the 
infrastructure, . . ." Rohrbach Depo. Vol I, p. 47,ll. 10-20. Hook-on fees are selectively levied 
to pay undetermined expenses, which somehow are not part of "all expenses" in addition to the 
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tract fees, and thereby violates the prohibition in the contracts of non-uniform charges. 
To equitably apportion benefits and costs, the 1957 Contract Article 12 requires (and 
therefore the 1962 and 1977 Contracts require) for the board to make m u a l  assessments and 
charges on the basis of a annual uniform charge expressed as a rate per-acre of assessable land, 
and a uniform tract charge for each operating unit in the amount sufficient when taken together 
with the acreage charge, to meet all the expenses of the district, including its costs of operation 
and maintenance, its annual construction charge obligation and its requirements for maintenance 
of a reserve fund. Ex. C 2-4. This is consistent with Idaho's statutory requirement for 
assessments to be against the lands, not against the consnmer or user(s). The charge of hook-on 
fees against new users shifts the cost of the yet unknown future project(s) 60m the ratepayers at 
large to the new ratepayers non-proportionately and not uniformly in breach of the contracts. It 
shifts assessments from against the land to people in breach of the contracts. 
Since uniform assessments and tract fees are required to cover all the expenses of HLID, 
ostensibly a charge for hook-on fees can only be a collection of money for something other than 
the expenses of the irrigation district. Costs must be apportioned and assessed against the land, 
and paid for in relation to the apportioned benefits. Paying expenses out of and charging hook- 
on fees only some ratepayers hook-on fees violate the contracts with the United States. The 
district court erred finding the contracts do not impact hook-on fees. 
CONCLUSION. 
The district court determined the board had authority to collect hook-on fees against only 
new users. The district court found the authority in the board's bylaws and in LC. $43-1909(e) of 
the Irrigation District Domestic Water Revenue Act, relying on Loomis and Hailey's equity buy- 
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in formula under the Revenue Bonding Act. The district court erred as a matter or law. 
Hook-on fees are a forced contribution upon select ratepayers to serve public needs at 
large. Idaho Bldg Contractors Ass 'n v. City of Coeur d3Alene, 126 Idaho 740,890 P.2d 326 
(1995), citing Brewster v. City ofPocatello, 115 Idaho 502, 504, 768 P.2d 765, 767 (1988). The 
revenue generated is an impermissible tax. 
ATTORNEY PEES ON APPEAL. 
Appellant respectfully requests costs and an award of attorney fees. In support of this 
request for attorney fees and costs it should be noted the board could have obtained a judicial 
determination of the validity of hook-on fees and increases under the Judicial Confirmation Law. 
I.C. $7-1301 et seq. The board did not seek assistance pursuant to the Judicial Confirmation 
Law, even though it was apprised ofthe requirement to create reasonable formuias with 
professionals' assistance in enforcing an impact fee. (Aff. Ex. A, pp. 66-67,82). Appellant was 
forced to address the issue and obtain the Court's declarations. 
As well, Appellant respectfully requests costs and a11 award of attorney fees pursuant to 
the Private Attorney General Doctrine (State v. District Court of Fourth Judicial Dist. 143 Idaho 
695,152 P.3d 566 (2007) ((citing 152 P.3d 566Miller v. EchoHmk, 126 Idaho 47,49,878 P.2d 
746,748 (1994) ((citing Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 106 Idaho 571,577-78,682 P.2d 
524,530-31(1984)), 42 U.S.C. §I983 and42 U.S.C. $1988, Rule 561.R.C.P., LC. $12-117 and 
LC. $12-121. 
I 
DATED this day of July, 2009. 
By: I. y G d i  
Scott Rose, ID Bar #4197 
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